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When First Amendment Principles And
Local Zoning Regulations Collide
STEVEN I. BRODY*
INTRODUCTION

When two well-established and important constitutional principles
face off against one another in the modern day forum of the courts,
fundamental changes will occur which affect the nature of those
principles and their interrelationships. Such is the case when the First
Amendment protections afforded non-obscene but sexually explicit
material have collided with the strong presumption of validity traditionally afforded local zoning regulations.
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides
important protection of an individual's freedom of speech and freedom of expression,' including protection of non-obscene but sexually
explicit movies, books, magazines and dancing. 2 Since Village of
* Associate, Siemon, Larsen & Marsh, Chicago, Illinois. B.A. 1985 Northern
Illinois University; J.D. 1988, Northern Illinois University College of Law. The
author would like to gratefully acknowledge Lisa M. Rove and William D. Ellison
for their encouragement, generous help and thoughtful critique of drafts of this
article.
1. "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press . . . ." U.S. CONST., amend. I. The First Amendment has been made
applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
2. The First Amendment does not protect obscene material. See Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). Under
the Supreme Court's test, enunciated in Miller, for determining whether material is
obscene, the Court found material obscene if:
(a) "the average person, applying contemporary community standards"
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest;
(b) [if] the work depicts or describes; in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) [if] the
work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value.
Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (citation omitted). However, sexually explicit material which
is non-obscene is entitled to First Amendment protection. See Young v. American
Mini-Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976); see also Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904
F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (held that nonobscene nude dancing is entitled
to limited First Amendment protection and statute providing for total ban on nudity
in public places was unconstitutional).
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Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,' local zoning regulation has enjoyed a
strong presumption of validity. In assessing the constitutionality of
local zoning regulations, courts have generally applied the highly
4
deferential "mere rationality" standard of review.
Inevitable conflicts have arisen between local governments attempting to regulate sexually oriented businesses, 5 and the First
Amendment, which protects the owners and operators, as well as

purveyors, of such sexually oriented businesses. The resulting case

law has wrestled with the difficult problem of the lawful scope of
local zoning power over businesses that deal in these forms of
expression. 6
The initial determination for any court reviewing a zoning ordinance which impacts First Amendment expression is the standard of
review to be applied. If the ordinance is merely a time, place and
manner restriction, the court will review the ordinance under the tests
set forth in Heffron v. InternationalSociety for Krishna Consciousness, Inc.,7 and United States v. O'Brien.8 9 That initial determination
will be based on the court's determination of whether the ordinance
in question focuses merely on the place and manner in which adult
uses can be operated (content-neutral), or whether the ordinance is
aimed at restricting the content of the expression (content-based).
3. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
4. See, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 8 (1974); Euclid,
272 U.S. at 395. See generally DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE CONTROLS § 2.38
(1981); 1 NoiuAN WILLIAMS, JR., AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW § 7.03 (1988 &
Supp. 1991). While in theory the "mere rationality" or "minimum scrutiny" test is
applied to land use zoning regulations, some states continue to scrutinize zoning
regulations in a manner reminiscent of Lochner-era substantive due process. See 1
WILLIAMS, supra, §§ 6.01-44; R. Marlin Smith, The Uncertain State of Zoning Law
in Illinois, 60 CHi.-KENT L. REv. 93, 93-100 (1984).

5. For purposes of this Article, the term "sexually oriented businesses" refers
only to non-obscene sexually explicit material and entertainment such as adult
bookstores, adult theatres and the like.
6. In addition to these questions being raised with respect to adult uses, similar
First Amendment/zoning issues have arisen with respect to the zoning of religious
uses. See generally Mark C. Cordes, Where to Pray? Religious Zoning & the First
Amendment, 35 KAN. L. REv. 697 (1987).
7. 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
8. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 40-41. Practically, the courts will generally use the O'Brien test. However, in addition to the four-part test enunciated in
O'Brien, the courts will also mandate that the third prong of the Heffron test be
satisfied, i.e., reasonable alternative channels of communication. The combination
of the O'Brien factors and the reasonable alternative channels of communication
prong of Heffron make up what Professor Tribe calls the "track one" approach to
content-neutral First Amendment questions. See infra notes 18-49 and accompanying
text.
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Most courts which have reviewed adult use zoning ordinances have
found the legislation to be content-neutral and have reviewed the
ordinance under the O'Brien/Heffron tests.
The case law to date strongly suggests that under the O'Brien!
Heffron analysis there are three areas of concern for municipalities
which pass adult use zoning ordinances and adult use owners who
contemplate challenges to those ordinances: (1) the ordinance must
provide a sufficient factual basis to support a finding of substantial
or important governmental interest; (2) the ordinance's definitions of
adult uses and restrictions must be narrowly tailored to affect only
those businesses which the ordinance intends to regulate; and (3) the
ordinance must provide reasonable alternative channels of communication for the dissemination of the affected expression protected under
the First Amendment.
I.
A.

BACKGROUND

FREEDOM OF SPEECH

The fundamental right to freedom of speech is guaranteed in the
First Amendment to the United States Constitution. 0 The framers of
the Constitution intentionally provided for freedom of speech in order
to promote an informed arena for ideological debate." One cannot
be punished or discriminated against simply because his opinions or
expressions are unpopular or are inconsistent with contemporary
thinking.' 2 The Supreme Court has even adopted the following state10. See U.S. CONST., amend. I.
11. See Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. Ci. L. REv. 20 (1975).
12. See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 79 (1981) (quoting
Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4-5, reh'g denied, 337 U.S. 934 (1949)).
"[T]he court must remain attentive to the guarantees of the First Amendment, and
in particular to the protection they afford to minorities against the 'standardization
of ideas . . . by . . . dominate [sic] political or community groups."' Id.; see also
Basiardanes v. City of Galveston, 682 F.2d 1203, 1214 (5th Cir. 1982); Purple Onion,
Inc. v. Jackson, 511 F. Supp. 1207, 1217-18 (N.D. Ga. 1981) ("that expression is
sexually oriented ... does not affect its First Amendment protection").
The Court in Terminiello stated that
[t]he vitality of civil and political institutions in our society depends on free
discussion. As Chief Justice Hughes wrote . ., it is only through free
debate and free exchange of ideas that government remains responsive to
the will of the people and peaceful change is effected. The right to speak
freely and to promote diversity of ideas and programs is therefore one of
the chief distinctions that sets us apart from totalitarian regimes ....
That is why freedom of speech, though not absolute, is nevertheless
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ment made by Voltaire in summarizing its zealous adherence to First
Amendment principles: "I [may] disapprove of what you say, but I
will defend to the death your right to say it."' 3 Thus, the principle of
freedom of speech and protection of that right is a fundamental
component of the First Amendment and the guarantees provided by
the Constitution.
Although the public has a right to free speech, and the Supreme
Court gives First Amendment guarantees broad protection, the Court
has recognized that government has the right to reasonably control
the dissemination of information,' 4 provided the government complies
protected against censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to produce

a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above
public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest. There is no room under our
Constitution for a more restrictive view. For the alternative would lead to
standardization of ideas either by legislatures, courts, or dominant political
or community groups.
Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4-5, reh'g denied, 337 U.S. 934 (1949).
13. Young v. American Mini-Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 63, reh'g denied, 429
U.S. 873 (1976) (citing S. Tallentyre, The Friends of Voltaire 199 (1907)); see also EBru, Inc. v. Graves, 566 F. Supp. 1476 (D.N.J. 1983). In Graves, Judge Sarokin
commented on Voltaire's epithet:
Voltaire did not write: "I disapprove of what you say, but will defend to
the death your right to say it, unless the subject is sex." Nor did the framers
of the United States Constitution. So-called adult bookstores are established
to sell merchandise intended to arouse sexual passions. They also seem to
arouse passions of an entirely different sort. If a merchant announced his
intention to open a store dedicated to murder mysteries, no matter how
violent or bloody, nary a picket or protester would appear. But should one
announce that sex is to be the main theme, then organized opposition is
inevitable. The public permits books, movies and television to inundate us
with murder by gun or knife, strangling, rape, beatings and mayhem, all of
which are illegal. But the depiction of sexual acts, most of which are legal,
are condemned with a furor. We will tolerate without a murmur a movie
showing the most brutal murder, but display a couple in the act of love and
the outcry is deafening. This is not meant to be a defense of the sleazy
movies and adult bookstores which pander to the bizarre and the deviant,
but it is a plea for perspective in deciding whether such materials genuinely
warrant an intrusion into the rights guaranteed by the first amendment.
No matter how offensive the majority may find a particular form of
speech, it is fundamental to our democracy that the views of the minority
cannot be and should not be stifled.
Id. at 1477-78.
14. See Members of the City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent,
466 U.S. 789 (1984) (municipality has the right to control speech through the use of
reasonable time, place and manner restrictions); Heffron v. International Society for
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with certain constitutional dictates. According to Professor Tribe, the
abridgment of First Amendment speech usually takes one of two
forms. 5 First, the government can regulate protected speech by "singling out actions for government control or penalty either (a) because
of the specific message or viewpoint such actions express, or (b)
because of the effects produced by awareness of the information or
ideas such actions impart."' 16 Second, the government, without aiming
at the examples above, may restrict the flow of information and ideas
while pursuing other goals either "(a) by limiting an activity through
which information and ideas might be conveyed, or (b) by enforcing
rules compliance with which might discourage the communication of
ideas or information."' 7 Professor Tribe suggests that the legal challenges to such restrictions have ultimately led to the Supreme Court's
application of a "two track" approach to determining whether governmental regulation is violative of the First Amendment.
1. Track One Analysis
Under the "track one" approach, the governmental regulation is
aimed at the communicative aspects or impact of the speech or
expression." This track is commonly referred to as "content-based"
regulation in that governmental regulation or restriction is based on
the content of the speech or because of the ideas which are contained
in the speech. In a track one analysis, Professor Tribe suggests that
the Court will use a strict scrutiny analysis, asking whether the contentbased regulation is "a precisely drawn means of serving a compelling
state interest."' 19 In Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 20 the
Court struck down an ordinance which prohibited non-labor picketing
in or near public schools, except for "the peaceful picketing of any
school involved in a labor dispute." '2 In striking down the ordinance,
Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 645-46 (1981) (state could regulate the
where, when and how of dissemination of protected speech on its fairgrounds).
15. See LAURENCE H. TIaE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-2 (2d ed.
1988).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.

19. See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S.
530, 540 (1980); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Belloti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978);
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (per curiam).
20. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
21. Id. at 73 (citing from the Municipal Code, c. 193-1(i)).
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the Court reiterated the importance of the first amendment guarantees
stating that "above all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression22because of its message, its
ideas, its subject matter, or its content."1
Thus, the requirements under a track one analysis recognize that
protected speech may not be regulated according to a scheme accomplished on the basis of the content of such speech.2 3 It is important
to recognize, however, that the Court has held that certain types of
speech, although protected, warrant a lower degree of protection than
others, even under a track one analysis. Those types of speech
afforded less protection include: fighting words,2 obscenity, 25 advocacy to incite unlawful action, 26 false statements of fact, 27 and child
pornography.28
Track Two Analysis
Under the track two approach, four basic elements are weighed
to determine the constitutionality of the regulation: (1) the regulations
2.

22. Id. at 95.
23. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980); Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley,
408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972); Heffron, 452 U.S. at 648-49; United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367 (1968); see also Developments in the Law -*Zoning, 91 HARv. L. REv.
1427, 1550 (1978).
24. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). In upholding a
conviction under a statute which prohibited addressing another person in an offensive
or annoying way in a public place, the Court stated that "fighting words ...

are no

essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step
to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the
social interest in order and morality." Id. at 572.
25. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). In Roth, the Court held
that obscenity is not protected under the First Amendment and that material would
be tested for obscenity under the following standard: "whether to the average person,
applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material
taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest." Id. at 489.
26. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). The Court
here held that regulation proscribing speech advocating the use of force or crime
could only be upheld when two conditions have been met: (1) the advocacy is
"directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action;" and (2) the advocacy is
also "likely to incite or produce such action." Id. at 477.
27. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). The Court upheld
the ability of government to define liability for a publisher of defamatory statements,
held that "there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact." Id. at 340.
28. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). The Court stated that First
Amendment value of permitting children to be photographed while involved in sexual
conduct is "exceedingly modest, if not de minimus." Id. at 762. The Court went on
to state that it is "not rare that a content-based classification of speech has been
accepted because ... the evil to be restricted so overwhelmingly outweighs the
expressive interests, if any, at stake, that no process of case-by-case adjudication is
required." Id. at 763-64.
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must be content-neutral; (2) the regulations must further a substantial
governmental interest which is unrelated to the suppression of speech;
(3) the restrictions must be narrowly tailored; and (4) reasonable
alternative channels of communication must remain open for the
dissemination of the restricted speech.
a.

Regulations Must Be Content-Neutral

The Supreme Court has recognized that First Amendment protected speech may not be constitutionally regulated or restricted based
on its content2 9 without the strictest judicial scrutiny. 30 Therefore,
restrictions affecting protected First Amendment speech generally will
be upheld only if the regulations are content-neutral."' In order to
determine whether regulations are content-neutral, and are not seeking
to suppress protected speech, the Court has interpreted the Constitution to require that three criteria be met. First, the government must
demonstrate that it has a substantial governmental interest which is
unrelated to the suppression of protected speech.3 2 Second, the government must show that the means which are utilized to promote the
substantial governmental interest are narrowly tailored to accomplish
that goal. 3 And third, the government must show that there remain
29. E.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980). Put another way, the Court
has consistently held that government may not suppress ideas by impeding the free
flow of protected speech. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972)
(citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971) (conviction for wearing jacket
bearing the words "Fuck the Draft" held violative of First and Fourteenth Amendments)); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969) (conviction for uttering defamatory
words about the American flag held unconstitutional); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S.
375 (1962) (punishment for persons speaking out on public issues before grand jury,
where such speech does not represent a "clear and present danger," is violative of
the First Amendment); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (meeting held by
advocate of violence was held to be within the protections of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
30. Professor Tribe suggests that content-based restrictions must be analyzed
under a "track two" analysis. This analysis, employing strict judicial scrutiny,
requires the governemntal regulation to further a compelling state interest using the
least restrictive means. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW §
12-2 (2d ed. 1988).
31. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 99 (1972).
32. See Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452
U.S. 640, 650-51 (1981) (upholding safety regulation relating to the orderly flow of
people in a congested high-traffic area).
33. Id.; Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981); Robert M.
Anderson & Thomas W. Mayo, Land Use Control, 35 SYRACUSE L.J. 485, 496-97
(1982); see also Kenneth L. Turchi, Comment, Municipal Zoning Restrictions on

Adult Entertainment: Young, Its Progeny, and Indianapolis' Special Exception
Ordinance, 58 IND. L.J. 505, 511 (1983).
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open reasonable alternative channels of communication for the dis4
semination of the affected speech.1
b. Substantial Governmental Interest Unrelated to Suppression of
Protected Speech
In order for a government regulation to meet this first prong of
the time, place and manner restriction analysis, the primary motive
for the restriction may not be the suppression of protected speech. In
United States v. O'Brien," the United States government prosecuted
O'Brien for the destruction of his draft card. O'Brien asserted that
the destruction of his draft card in violation of the law was a symbolic
means of expressing his dissatisfaction with the war in Vietnam. The
government, however, countered that the law providing for "in tact"
draft cards was necessary to promote the smooth and efficient functioning of the organization of the military.16 The government argued
that there existed a substantial government interest in the ability of
the government to locate and identify persons for national defense
purposes.3 7 The Court held that the government had shown a substantial government interest in promoting the smooth operation of the
military, especially during times of war or conflict.38 The Court thus
concluded that although O'Brien's display of dissatisfaction was
intended to convey a message and, indeed, was perceived as a message
by observers, his conduct was subject to regulation.3 9 Therefore, where
the primary motive of the restrictions is not the suppression of ideas,
no First Amendment violation is found to have occurred.
In another more recent case, Heffron v. InternationalSociety for
Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 40 the Supreme Court upheld another
government restriction on protected speech, this time a regulation
which dealt with the dissemination of religious material. The Minne34. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 101 (1972) (third prong

of the time, place and manner restriction test requires reasonable alternative channels
of communication); see Superior Films v. Department of Education of Ohio, 346
U.S. 587, 589 (1954) (per curiam); see also Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S.
676, 683-84 (1968); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150, 153-54 (1959).
35. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).

36. Id.at 378-81.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 380, 382.

39. The Court also noted that "when 'speech' and 'non-speech' elements are
combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental
interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitation on First
Amendment freedoms. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376.
40. 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
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sota Agricultural Society, a Minnesota public corporation that runs
the. state fair, promulgated a rule which prohibits the sale or distribution of any merchandise, including printed or written material,
except from duly licensed fixed locations at the fairgrounds. The
International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. challenged the
rule as an abridgment of their First Amendment rights. The State of
Minnesota maintained that the rule was necessary due to the sheer
volume of the crowd and the particular nature of the temporary
forum which created substantial safety coricerns for the State; The
Court held that the State's asserted governmental interest must be
assessed in light of the forum's "special attributes." 4 Therefore, what
will constitute a substantial governmental interest will vary depending
on the factual situation presented. In Heffron, the temporary nature
of the forum and the safety concerns due to the large crowd constituted a substantial governmental interest sufficient to justify the
restrictive rule.
c.

Narrowly Tailored

Assuming that a given restriction on protected speech does serve
a substantial governmental interest, the restriction must also be nar42
rowly tailored to fulfill the governmental interest sought to be served.
In Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,43 an ordinance was passed which
banned all nudity from being displayed on outdoor movie theater
screens which were visible from any public place by characterizing
such displays as a public nuisance." The City of Jacksonville conceded
that the ordinance went far beyond banning "obscene" material as
previously defined by the Court. 45 With that in mind, the Court held
that "the Constitution does not permit government to decide which
types of otherwise protected speech are sufficiently offensive to require
protection for the unwilling listener or viewer. Rather, . . . , the
burden normally falls upon the viewer to 'avoid further bombardment
41. Id. at 650-51 ("[Clonsideration of a forum's special attributes is relevant
to the constitutionality of a regulation since the significance of the governmental
interest must be assessed in light of the characteristic nature and function of the
particular forum involved.").
42. Heffron, 452 U.S. at 654-55 (holding that broad-based restrictions on fair
activities were necessary and appropriate given the important governmental objective
of crowd control); Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981)
(substantial restriction on all types of live entertainment failed this prong as not being
narrowly tailored).
43. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
44. Id. at 208.
45. Id. (citing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)).
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of [his] sensibilities simply by averting [his] eyes."' The Court also
struck down the ordinance as impermissibly vague because the ordi-

nance did not take into account differing degrees or types of nudity
which fell within the realm of protected speech. 47 Thus, the regulation
failed the second prong of the time, place and manner test which
mandates that the restriction be narrowly tailored in order to protect
against the abrogation of fundamental constitutional rights.
d.

Reasonable Open Alternative Channels of Communication
The final prong of the time, place and manner test requires that

the narrowly-tailored means employed to promote a substantial gov-

ernmental interest must additionally leave open reasonable alternative
channels of communication for the dissemination of the protected
speech. 48 The First Amendment requires that the public have open
access to information and that any regulations which impinge on
protected speech impose no restrictions which cut out the public's
reasonable access to such information. The government may impose
restrictions on the free flow of information only to the extent that

the public maintains reasonable access to the expression.4 9 Therefore,
no government regulation of protected speech can permissibly restrict
adequate channels of communication which obstruct the public's
access to such information.
B. GOVERNMENTAL POWER TO ZONE

Unlike the constitutional right to freedom of speech, the power

of government to zone is of relatively recent origin. Zoning essentially
developed as an outgrowth of the law of nuisance law. 0 The Supreme
Court had upheld "nuisance-like" municipal land use regulations at
46. Id. at 210-11 (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971)).

47. Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 212-14 ("[The ordinance] sweepingly forbids display
of all films containing any uncovered buttocks or breasts, irrespective of context or
pervasiveness. Thus is would bar a film containing a picture of a baby's buttocks,
the nude body of a war victim, or scenes from a culture in which nudity is
indigenous.... Clearly all nudity cannot be deemed obscene even as to minors.").
48. E.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986);
Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984); City
Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 807 (1984); Heffron
v. Int'l Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647-48 (1981); Virginia
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
771 (1976); Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 101 (1972).
49. E.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756-57 (1976) (First Amendment protections are afforded
both to the source and the recipient of the protected speech).
50. See DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 1.3 (1982).
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least three times5 by the early part of the twentieth century - prior
to the passage of the first comprehensive zoning ordinance by the
City of New York in 1916.52 Within ten years of the enactment of
New York's zoning ordinance, approximately 425 municipalities (representing more than half of the country's urban population) had
passed similar measures.53 It was not until the end of that ten-year
zoning boom that the Supreme Court first upheld the constitutionality
of zoning regulation in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 5 4 In
Euclid, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of an ordinance passed
by a suburb of Cleveland, Ohio." The Supreme Court reasoned that
the zoning ordinance represented a valid exercise of the police power
and rejected the landowner's argument that the ordinance deprived
him of his liberty and property in contravention of the dictates of the
Fourteenth Amendment.5 6 The Court held that so long as the classifications made under a zoning ordinance were "fairly debatable, '5 7
and the provisions were not "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable,
having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or
general welfare,""8 the ordinance would be upheld as constitutional.
Following its decision in Euclid in 1926, the Supreme Court heard
only three cases59 dealing with zoning law until its 1974 decision in

51. Hadacheck v. Los Angeles, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (upholding ordinance which
excluded brickyards within certain areas of the city); Reinman v. Little Rock, 237
U.S. 171 (1915) (upholding ordinance which excluded livery stables from certain areas
of the town); Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909) (upholding ordinance which
divided Boston into two building districts with different height limitations applicable
to each).
52. ROBERT H. NELSON, ZONING AND PROPERTY RIGHTS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
AMERICAN SYSTEM OF LAND-USE REGULATION 8 (1977); S.Makielski, Jr., THE POLITICS
OF ZONING 1 (1966); 1 E.C. YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE 9 (1978).

53.

NELSON,

supra note 52, at 9.

54. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 397. The landowner relied on that portion of the Fourteenth
Amendment which provided that no State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 3.
57. 272 U.S. at 388.
58. Id.at 395.
59. Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928) (struck zoning ordinance
down as applied to plaintiff's property because application of the zoning regulations
would not promote general welfare); Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v.
Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928) (struck down a zoning ordinance regulating certain
uses with two-thirds consent of adjoining landowners as an unlawful delegation of
power); Zahn v. Board of Public Works, 274 U.S. 325 (1927) (upheld Los Angeles'
comprehensive zoning ordinance).
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Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas.60 In Belle Terre, a landowner

challenged that portion of a zoning ordinance which restricted his
land to use as a one-family dwelling which allowed the housing of
either a "family" or no more than two unrelated persons. 6' The
plaintiffs, the landowner and three of the six unrelated college students
renting from him, attempted to have the ordinance reviewed under

more exacting constitutional scrutiny62 by alleging that the ordinance

infringed on their fundamental constitutional rights of privacy and
travel.6 3 The Court did not agree that any fundamental constitutional
rights were implicated by the zoning ordinance and upheld the regulation under the mere rationality test." However, three years later, in
Moore v. City of East Cleveland,65 the Court was faced with an

ordinance similar to that which had been upheld in Belle Terre, but

which did not even allow related persons to live together under certain

circumstances." The Court struck down the ordinance as an abridg-

ment of the fundamental right of freedom of choice relating to family
matters, and applied the strict scrutiny test requiring the ordinance to
be the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling state interest. 67
60. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
61. Id. at 2. The zoning ordinance in question defined a "family" as "[o]ne
or more person related by blood, adoption, or marriage, living and cooking together
as a single housekeeping unit, exclusive of servants. A number of persons but not
exceeding two (2) living and cooking together .. . though not related ... shall be
deemed to constitute a family." Id.
62. The plaintiffs in Belle Terre were attempting to have the Court scrutinize
the ordinance under a standard more exacting than the mere rationality standard
adopted almost fifty years earlier in Euclid.
63. Id. at 7.
64. In upholding the Belie Terre zoning ordinance, the Court recognized the
broad range of values which may be protected and served by zoning restrictions:
A quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor vehicles restricted
are legitimate guidelines in a land-use project addressed to family needs. ...
The police power is not confined to elimination of filth, stench, and
unhealthy places. It is ample to lay out zones where family values, youth
values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make the area a
sanctuary for people.
Belle Terre, 416 U.S. at 9.
65. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
66. Id. at 498-99. In striking down the East Cleveland ordinance, the Court
distinguished its holding in Belle Terre on the grounds that while the Belle Terre
ordinance had preserved the family, the East Cleveland ordinance "slic[ed] deeply"
into the family by prohibiting even cousins to live together in a single household. Id.
at 498.
67. Id. at 499-500. The Court concluded that although the governmental
interests sought to be achieved were "legitimate," the ordinance only had a "tenuous
relation" to the achievement of those ends. Id. at 500.
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Thus, these decisions established that the normal deference accorded
to zoning legislation through use of the mere rationality standard does
In such cases, the
not apply where fundamental rights are implicated.
6
imposition of strict scrutiny is appropriate. 1
II.

ZONING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

In the seminal cases involving the interplay of zoning and the
First Amendment, the Court has been urged to utilize the strict
scrutiny analysis in determining whether local ordinances pass constitutional muster. A closer look at the Court's decisions in Young v.70
American Mini-Theatres, Inc.,69 Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim,
and City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. ,7I provide a clearer
understanding of the direction of zoning/First Amendment law, and
provide a useful backdrop with which to evaluate more recent lower
court decisions and local ordinances.
A.

72
YOUNG V. AMERICAN MINI-THEATERS, INC.

In Young, the Supreme Court first decided a case "inwhich the
interests of freedom of expression protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments have been implicated by a municipality's commercial zoning ordinance." ' 73 At issue in the Young case was the
constitutionality of certain portions of Detroit's "Anti-Skid Row"
ordinance which singled out adult bookstores and theatres for special
treatment under the ordinance .74 The original Detroit "Anti-Skid
Row" ordinance, passed in 1962, was based on findings by the Detroit
Common Council that certain types of businesses, when concentrated,
68. Likewise, in cases where an ordinance discriminates against a suspect class,

the Court has applied a strict scrutiny analysis. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights
v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). In City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985), plaintiffs attempted to
have the Court apply a heightened middle-level scrutiny arguing that mentally retarded

persons constituted a "quasi-suspect class." This middle-level scrutiny would require
the ordinance to be substantially related to an important interest. In City of Cleburne,
the Court did not agree that any "quasi-suspect class" was implicated, but struck

down the ordinance nonetheless as being unrelated to a legitimate governmental
interest under the mere rationality test of Euclid. Id. at 442-50.
69. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).

70. 452 U.S. 61 (1981).

71. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
72. 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (plurality opinion).
73. Id. at 76 (Powell, J., concurring).

74. Id. at 54-55.
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can have a blighting effect on the surrounding neighborhood. 75
Under certain amendments to Detroit's zoning ordinance, adult
bookstores and adult theatres were added to a list of businesses which
could not be located within 1,000 feet of any two other similarly
regulated uses without first obtaining prior special approval. 76 The
ordinance also prohibited the location of adult bookstores and theatres
within 500 feet of a residential dwelling. 77 The Detroit City Council
added adult bookstores and theatres to the list of regulated uses in
response to the rapid increase in such uses over the previous five
s

years .7

In a plurality opinion, 79 the Court upheld the constitutionality of
the Detroit ordinances. The Court held that the ordinance was not
75.

OFFICIAL ZONING ORDINANCE § 66.0000 (1972). The
ordinance stated:
In the development and execution of this Ordinance, it is recognized
that there are some uses which, because of their very nature, are recognized
as having serious objectionable operational characteristics, particularly when
DETROIT,

MICH.,

several of them are concentrated under certain circumstances, thereby having
a deleterious effect upon the adjacent areas. Special regulation of these uses

is necessary to insure that these adverse effects will not contribute to the
blighting or downgrading of the surrounding neighborhood. These special
regulations are itemized in this section. The primary control or regulation is
for the purpose of preventing a concentration of these uses in any one area
(i.e. not more than two such uses within one thousand feet of each other
which would create such adverse effects).

DETROIT, MICH., OFFICIAL ZONING ORDINANCE

§ 66.0000 (1972).

Supporters of the amendments to the ordinance, including urban planners and
real estate experts, claimed that "the location of several such businesses in the same
neighborhood tends to attract an undesirable quantity and quality of transients,
adversely affects property values, causes an increase in crime, especially prostitution,
and encourages residents and businesses to move elsewhere." Young, 427 U.S. at 55.
76.

DETROIT, MICH.,

ORDINANCE

742-G (Nov. 2, 1972) (amending

DETROIT,

§§ 32.007, 66.0000, 66.0101 (1972)). Following
amendment of the zoning ordinance, "regulated uses" included adult bookstores,
adult theatres, mini-theatres, bars, cabarets, hotels and motels, pawnshops, pool and
billiard halls, public lodging houses, secondhand stores, shoeshine parlors, and taxi
dance halls.
MICH.,

OFFICUL

ZONING ORDINANCE

77. DETROIT, MICH., ORDINANCE 743-G (Nov. 2, 1972).
78. Young, 427 U.S. at 55 n.8. Police statistics indicated that between 1967
and 1972 the number of adult theatres had increased from two to twenty-five, and a
comparable increase had occurred in the number of adult bookstores and other adult
uses. Id.
79. The Court split 4-1-4. Justice Stevens' opinion, joined by Justices Burger,
White, Powell, and Rehnquist, upheld the ordinance. However, Justice Powell
rejected that portion of Justice Stevens' opinion that dealt with the issue of how
courts should review zoning regulations that distinguish among businesses based on
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unconstitutionally vague as it applied to an "adults only" movie
theater that displayed sexually explicit films on a regular basis.8 0 More
importantly, however, the Court held that despite the fact that sexually
oriented businesses were singled out for special treatment under the
zoning ordinances, such classification did not violate the First Amend8
ment or the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. '
The Court held that the ordinance constituted a permissible contentneutral time, place and manner restriction because the purpose of the
ordinance was not to eliminate, censor or supress the protected speech,
but rather, to "preserve the quality of urban life" by avoiding the
"secondary effects" of such businesses8 2 on the community through
the content of the speech at issue. Justice Stevens wrote a separate concurring opinion
on that issue. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Stewart, and Blackmun dissented. Young,
427 U.S. at 50.
80. Id. at 61. The Court reasoned that because the challenged ordinance
unquestionably applied to the parties before the Court, the vagueness claim did not
affect the litigants. The Respondents argued, however, that they had standing to
raise the vagueness claim because the Court had previously ruled that litigants in
First Amendment cases could raise claims affecting third parties because an ordinance
affecting protected First Amendment speech could cause parties not before the Court
to refrain from exercising their First Amendment rights.
Responding to this argument, Justice Stevens noted that such an exception to
the traditional standing rules was justified by the overriding importance of First
Amendment protections, the exception is only justified where the ordinance's deterrent
effect on protected speech is "real and substantial" and the ordinance is not "readily
subject to a narrowing construction by the state courts." Justice Stevens concluded
that the litigants could not meet either of these requirements and rejected the
vagueness claims. Young, 427 U.S. at 60 (quoting Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,
422 U.S. 205, 216 (1975)).
In his dissent, Justice Blackmun sharply criticized Stevens' view on the vagueness
issue. Justice Blackmun reasoned that the definition of what made a book or movie
"adult" was impermissibly vague. Under the ordinances, the "adult" classification
rested on whether the bookstore or theater presented material "'distinguished or
characterized by an emphasis on' certain specified activities, including sexual intercourse or specified anatomical areas." 427 U.S. at 89 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Blackmun's dissent argued that this definition was not helpful to a theater owner in
determining whether the ordinance was applicable:
It will be simple enough, as the operator screens films, to tell when one of
these areas or activities is being depicted, but if the depiction represents
only a part of the films' subject matter, I am at a loss to know how he will
tell whether they 'are distinguished or characterized by an emphasis' on
Id.

those areas and activities. The ordinance gives him no guidance ....

81. Young v. American Mini-Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
82. The secondary effects identified included neighborhood deterioration, increased crime rates, and the like, associated with adult businesses. See text accompanying supra note 73.
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regulation of the placement and concentration of such businesses. 3
Justice Stevens' plurality opinion pointed out that the city's goal of
avoiding or mitigating these "secondary effects" is one which "must
be accorded high respect" and is a substantial enough governmental
interest to justify the resulting incidental restriction on First Amendment speech. Justice Stevens' opinion recognized three elements for
judicial review of a zoning ordinance which regulates adult uses or
impinges on First Amendment rights. First, the ordinance must be
content-neutral - it must seek only to control the "secondary effects"
of adult uses and must not have as its objective the protection of
citizens from exposure to the content of the speech. 8 Second, there
must remain open alternative channels of communication - the
ordinance must not have the effect of "suppressing, or greatly restricting access to 'adult businesses,' but must leave the market
'essentially unrestrained.'"6 Third, the municipality must
provide a
factual record which supports the regulatory scheme. 87 Thus, if a
zoning ordinance which impacts First Amendment rights meets all
these tests, the plurality opinion calls for a reviewing court to defer
to the judgment of the legislative body and uphold the constitutionality of the ordinance."s
Justice Powell adopted the four-part test enunciated in United
States v. O'Briens9 for determining the constitutionality of a zoning

83. Young, 427 U.S. at 70-71.
84. Id. at 71. The Court did note, however, that the situation would be quite
different if adoption of the ordinance was motivated simply by a distaste for the
content of the speech itself or if the ordinance would have the effect of suppressing
or greatly restricting access to this form of protected expression. Id. at 71-72 n.35.
85. 427 U.S. at 71 n.34.
86. Id. at 71 n.35.
87. Id. at 62.

88. In Justice Powell's concurring opinion, he likewise found the Detroit
ordinance constitutional, but argued that the four-part test enunciated in United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), was the appropriate test for determining the
ordinance's constitutionality. Under the O'Brien test, a governmental regulation is
justified, despite its incidental impact on protected First Amendment rights, "if it is
within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on ... First Amend-

ment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest." Id.
at 377. Finding that the Detroit ordinance met all four parts of the O'Brien test,
Justice Powell concluded the ordinance was constitutional. Young, 427 U.S. at 8082 (Powell, J., concurring).
89. 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
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ordinance which impacts First Amendment protected speech. The
O'Brien test mandates: (1) that an ordinance must be within the
constitutional powers of the government; (2) that an ordinance must
further an important or substantial governmental interest; (3) that the
governmental interest must be unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and (4) that the incidental restriction on First Amendment
freedoms must be no more than necessary to accomplish the governmental interest. 9° A number of post-Young courts have also adopted'
the O'Brien factors as the proper approach. 9'
Following Young, in Hart Book Stores, Inc. v. Edmisten,92 the
Fourth Circuit analyzed an ordinance similar to that in Young by
employing the four-part O'Brien test. 93 The North Carolina statute
prohibited any two regulated uses from being located in the same
building. 94 The court concluded that the North Carolina statute was
merely a place and manner restriction,95 and, as such, satisfied the
O'Brien test. 96 Even though one district court predicted that the

90. Id. at 377.

91. See, e.g., Chulchian v. City of Indianapolis, 633 F.2d 27, 31 (7th Cir.
1980); Entertainment Concepts, Inc;, III v. Maciejewski, 631 F.2d 497, 504 (7th Cir.
1980); Genusa v. City of Peoria, 619 F.2d 1203, 1214 n.27 (7th Cir. 1980); Hart
Book Stores, Inc. v. Edmisten, 612 F.2d 821, 825.(4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447
U.S. 929 (1980); Borrago v. City of Louisville, 456 F. Supp. 30, 33 (W.D. Ky. 1978);
see also Bayside Enterprises, Inc. v. Carson, 450 F. Supp. 696, 703 (M.D. Fla. 1978).
92. 612 F.2d 821 (4th Cir. 1979).
93. For the elements of the O'Brien test, see text accompanying supra note 90.
The two district court cases which were consolidated in this appeal had both
analyzed the statute as outside the scope of Young, and had both held the statute
unconstitutional. Hart Book Stores, Inc. v. Edmisten, 450 F. Supp. 904 (E.D.N.C.
1978); U.T., Inc. v. Edmisten, Nos. 77-365 and 77-366 (W.D.N.C. July 24, 1978).
In Hart Books, the district court held that the statute violated the First Amendment
and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it amounted
to a "significant intrusion" into businesses dealing in protected First Amendment
expression without sufficient justification. In U. T., Inc., the court likewise found the
statute violative of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Additionally, the court
found the statute violative of the right to privacy and unconstitutionally vague.
94. The statute prohibited the location of any one "adult establishment" in
the same "building, premises, structure, or other facility" being occupied by another
"adult establishment" or "sexual device vendor." (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14202.11 (1977)). Under the statute, "adult establishment" is defined to include adult
bookstores, adult motion picture theaters, and adult mini-theaters having a preponderance of wares "distinguished or characterized by an emphasis on matter depicting,
describing, or relating to specified sexual activities or specified anatomical areas."
95. Hart Book Stores, 612 F.2d at 826-27.

96. Id. at 828-30. After concluding that the North Carolina statute was actually
less restrictive than the Detroit ordinance at issue in Young and that the zoning
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ordinance would fail to be effective, 97 this did not, in the court's
view, alter the fact that the statute was constitutional. Likewise, the
court rejected the owners' claims that the six-month amortization
provision made the statute too burdensome.9"
B.

SCHAD V. BOROUGH OF MOUNT EPHRAIM"

The next Supreme Court case which dealt with adult uses and
zoning came five years later in Schad. In Schad, a local zoning
ordinance prohibited live entertainment, including nude dancing, in
any establishment within the borough.10° James Schad, the owner of
an adult bookstore, was prosecuted and fined under the ordinance
for having installed glass booths through which patrons could watch
nude dancers.' 0 ' In holding the ordinance unconstitutional, the Supreme Court stated that "when a zoning law infringes upon a protected liberty, it must be narrowly drawn and must further a sufficiently
substantial government interest." 01 2 The Court held that the ordinance
failed to satisfy either requirement.

First, the Court held that the ordinance was unconstitutionally
overbroad. In addition to prohibiting nude dancing, the ordinance

would have the effect of banning dancing in musical and dramatic
works, 103 as well as any other forms of live commercial entertainment."' 4 Second, the Court held that Mount Ephraim's rationale for
enacting the ordinance did not constitute a substantial governmental

statute was "directed primarily at the noncommunicative aspects of protected expression, with only an incidental effect on expression itself," 612 F.2d at 827-28, the
court went on to hold that the statute passed all four parts of the O'Brien test. Id.
at 828-30.
97. Hart Book Stores, 450 F. Supp. at 907 ("statute would 'have a minimal
effect on degenerate conduct').
98. Hart Book Stores, 612 F.2d at 834; see also, Northend Cinema, Inc. v.
City of Seattle, 585 P.2d 1153, 1160 (1978) (en banc).
99. 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
100. MOUNT EPHRAIM, N.J., ORDINANCE § 99-15B (1975).
101. 452 U.S. at 64.
102. Id. at 68.
103. Id. at 65. The Court did not say that nude dancing, as prohibited in the
Mount Ephraim ordinance, is protected First Amendment expression. However, the
Court did say that nude dancing, in some forms, is entitled to First Amendment
protection. In addition, the Court stated that other activities prohibited under the
ordinance, such as dancing in musical or dramatic works, were protected under the
First Amendment. Id. at 65-66.
104. Id. at 66 n.5. The ordinance did not prohibit non-commercial live entertainment. Therefore, a high school could enact a play if no admission was charged
and it was not performed in a commercial theater. Id.
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689

interest.0 5 The municipality had argued that a ban on live entertainment would help solve problems created by the "secondary effects"
of such enterprises, 1' but no factual evidence in the record supported
the claim. 0 7
Justice White, writing for the majority, distinguished the holding
in Young as involving a "minimal burden on protected speech,"
rather than the total ban on a type of protected speech found in
Schad. I01 Although Schad noted that the Court in Young had "stated
that a zoning ordinance is not invalid merely because it regulates
activity protected under the First Amendment,"" 9 Justice White recognized that Young had "not impl[ied] that a municipality could ban
all adult theatres - much less all live entertainment or all nude
dancing - from its commercial districts citywide.""10
Although Young upheld that portion of a zoning ordinance
impacting free expression and Schad struck one down, the two
holdings are not in conflict. Young upheld an ordinance which merely
restricted the location of adult uses,"' while Schad struck down an2
ordinance which totally banned a protected First Amendment right."
However, the two decisions did differ in one important respect: the
Court in each case identified a different analysis to be employed in
zoning cases where the regulations involved adult uses and impacted
First Amendment rights. Thus, where Young stressed that the objective of the regulation must not be the suppression of protected
expression and that access to that expression must remain available,
Schad emphasized that regulation cannot be so broad as to completely
prohibit protected expression and that the regulation must further a
substantial governmental interest.
Following the Court's decision in Schad, the Fifth Circuit had
occasion to review the constitutionality of an adult use zoning ordi105. Id. at 72.

106. Id. at 73-74. Mount Ephraim argued that problems such as parking, trash,
police protection and medical care could be solved through the live entertainment
ban. However, the city provided no factual evidence in the record which supported
the conclusion that live entertainment presented more significant problems in these
areas than any other business enterprises. Id.
107. Id. The city also argued that without the ban, live entertainment would
take up commercial space necessary to serve the immediate needs of the community.
Id. at 72-73. The Court rejected this argument, finding that just about the only
service not available in the community at the time was live entertainment. Id.
108. Id. at 71.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. 427 U.S. at 52. See supra notes 73-92 and accompanying text.
112. 452 U.S. at 65-66. See supra notes 100-111 and accompanying text.
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nance from the City of Galveston in Basiardanes v. City of Galveston."' In Basiardanes, the court found that the ordinance was not a
time, place and manner restriction because it "drastically impair[ed]
the availability in Galveston of films protected for adult viewing by
the First Amendment." 4 Therefore, the ordinance had to be assessed
in light of the strict scrutiny standard applied in Schad."5 The court
focused on the failure of the city to study the effects of adult uses
and take into account the findings of such studies."16 The court noted
the sharp contrast between the factual record presented in Young and

the record from the city of Galveston." 7 This failure to provide a
sufficient factual record led the court to conclude that the city had
neither shown a substantial governmental interest nor established a
nexus between adult uses and urban blight or crime." 8 Finally, the
court determined that the ordinance was overbroad in basing its
definition of adult movies on a Texas law relating to the showing of
movies which minors may not view without accompaniment by an
adult." 9 "Whatever connection there is between crime or blight and
adult theaters, the requisite connection is surely missing with respect
to popular but sexually oriented films, which are covered by Ordinance
78-1.'"120

113. 682 F.2d 1203 (5th Cir. 1982).
114. Id. at 1214. This conclusion was supported, in large measure, by the fact
that of the 10-15% of the City in which adult uses were not banned outright, adult
uses were excluded from approximately 80-90% of those sites by the City's dispersal
requirements. Id. at 1209. The dispersal requirements prohibited an adult theater
from operating (1) within 500 feet of any residentially zoned area, or from any two,
or any combination of "pool halls, liquor stores, or bars"; (2) within 1,000 feet of
any other adult theater or bookstore; and (3) within 1,000 feet of any "church,
school, public park, or recreational facility where minors congregate." Id.
115. Id. at 1214-15.
116. Id. at 1215; see also Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61,
71-72 (1981); Avalon Cinema Corp. v. Thompson, 667 F.2d 659, 661 (8th Cir. 1981)
(en banc); Keego Harbor Co. v. City of Keego Harbor, 657 F.2d 94, 98 (6th Cir.
1981).
117. 682 F.2d at 1215.
118. 682 F.2d at 1215-16. The court also concluded that the timing of the
enactment of the ordinance casts doubt on the City's purported purposes of the
ordinance. Id. at 1216. The court speculated that the ordinance was prompted not
by concerns of crime and urban blight, but rather by the fact that the proposed adult
theater was located across from the renovation project of the City's Grand Opera
House. Id. This conclusion was buttressed by the fact that other uses, such as bars,
pool halls, pawn shops, and massage parlors remained unregulated. Id.
119. Id. at 1212-13.
120. Id. at 1217.
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In Alexander v. City of Minneapolis, 21 a pre-Renton case involving the constitutionality of a Minneapolis, Minnesota zoning ordinance which restricted the location of certain "adults-only" enterprises
including bookstores, theatres, saunas, massage parlors and "rap
parlors,' ' 22 the court held the ordinance violative of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. Relying primarily on Young and Schad, the
court held that because approximately thirty to thirty-two adult uses
must compete in the marketplace for only twelve available sites for
relocation, enforcement of the ordinance would have the effect of
"substantially reducing the number of adult bookstores and theatres
in Minneapolis" and "no new adult bookstores or theatres would be
able to open.' ' 2 Equating this with an unlawful restriction on the
right to purvey sexually oriented material and the public's right of
access to such material, the court agreed with the district court that
enforcement of the ordinance would not allow reasonable alternative
channels of communication for the dissemination of the protected
expression. '2
2
C. CITY OF RENTON V. PLA YTIME THEA TRES, INC.1 3

The most recent pronouncement from the Supreme Court regarding the interrelationship between First Amendment protections and
zoning came in 1986 in Renton. The city of Renton, Washington
enacted a zoning ordinance which, inter alia, prohibited adult motion
picture theatres' 26 from locating within 1,000 feet of any residential
27
zone, single or multiple family dwelling, church, park or school.
121. 698 F.2d 936 (8th Cir. 1983).
122. 698 F.2d at 936. "Rap parlors" are "establishments at which men may
converse with women who are not fully clothed." Id. at 936-37 n.2.
123. Id. at 938 (quoting Alexander v. City of Minneapolis, 531 F. Supp. 1162,
1172 (D. Minn. 1982)).
124. Id. at 939.
125. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
126. The term "adult movie picture theater" is defined in the ordinance as "[ain
enclosed building used for presenting motion picture films, video cassettes, cable
television, or any other such visual media, distinguished or characteri[zed by an
emphasis on matter depicting, describing or relating to 'specified sexual activities' or
'specified anatomical areas' ... for observation by patrons therein." 475 U.S. at
44.
127. Id. The original ordinance, approved in April, 1981, prohibited an adult
movie theater from locating within one mile of any school. In May, 1982, while the
federal lawsuit was still pending, the City amended the ordinance adding a statement
of reasons for its enactment and reducing the minimum allowable distance from any
school to 1,000 feet. Id. at 45.
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District Court vacated the injunction and held that the Renton ordinance did not substantially restrict any First Amendment rights, that
the city could rely on the experience of other cities as a rationale for
supporting passage of the ordinance, that the purpose of the ordinance
was unrelated to the suppression of protected speech, and that the
restrictions were no greater than necessary to further the governmental
interests involved. 29 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals applied the
four-part test from O'Brien' a and reversed the District Court's judgment in favor of the City. First, the Court of Appeals found that the
ordinance indeed constituted a substantial restriction on First Amendment freedoms.' The Ninth Circuit went on to conclude that Renton
had failed to support the ordinance with a factual record relating to
the city of Renton itself; Renton had neither established a substantial
governmental interest3 2 nor shown that the regulation was unrelated
to the suppression of speech.' 33
Characterizing the ordinance as a content-neutral time, place and
manner restriction designed to further substantial governmental interest and one not unreasonably restricting alternative channels of communication, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and
held the zoning ordinance constitutional.'3 4 The Court first concluded
that the Renton ordinance was content-neutral because is was not
aimed at suppressing speech on the basis of the content, but rather
was aimed at alleviating the "secondary effects" of the presence of
adult theatres on the surrounding community.' 35 The Court then
defined the applicable test for such a case as "whether the Renton
ordinance is designed to serve a substantial governmental interest and
allows for reasonable alternative avenues of communication."'1

6

128. Id. at 45.
129. Id.
130. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
131. Playtime Theatres, Inc. v. City of Renton, 748 F.2d 527, 534 (9th Cir.
1984).
132. Id. at 536-37.
133. Id. at 537-38.
134. Renton, 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
135. Id. at 48-49.
136. Id. at'50. The Court discussed the purposes of the ordinance as relating to
the prevention of the "secondary effects" such as protection of the city's retail trade,

maintenance of property values, and the protection of the city's neighborhoods. The

Court concluded that the city's purpose of attempting to "preserve the quality of
urban life" must be given "high respect." Id. at 48-50; see also Young v. American
Mini-Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 71 (1976).
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The Ninth Circuit found that the city had not shown the requisite

substantial governmental interest due, in large part, to its failure to
provide any factual record which related specifically to the city of
Renton.' 37 The Supreme Court, however, stated that
the First Amendment does not require a city, before enacting
such an ordinance, to conduct new studies or produce evidence
independent of that already generated by other cities, so long
as whatever ordinance the city relies upon is reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem that the city addresses.' 38

The Court distinguished the Renton ordinance from the one in Schad,
characterizing the Renton ordinance as "narrowly tailored" to achieve
the desired goals because the ordinance would only affect theatres
39
which are shown to produce secondary effects.'
In assessing whether the Renton ordinance had left open reasonable alternative channels of communication for disseminating the
protected expression, the Court rejected the reasoning of the Ninth
Circuit that, under the ordinance, the available land in Renton

137. Playtime Theatres, Inc. v. City of Renton, 748 F.2d 527, 536-37 (1984).
The Court of Appeals noted that in Young, the Supreme Court had found that "the
record disclosed a factual basis for the council's determination," id. at 536, and that
Justice Powell had cited to "reports and affidavits from sociologists and urban
planning experts, as well as some laymen." Id. The Ninth Circuit also noted that in
Schad, the Supreme Court had invalidated an ordinance stressing that the Borough
had failed to adequately justify the First Amendment restriction through evidence in
the record. Id. See also Kuzinich v. County of Santa Clara, 689 F.2d 1345 (9th Cir.
1982) (summary judgment reversed in part due to lack of evidence in the record);
Basiardanes v. City of Galveston, 682 F.2d 1203, 1215 (5th Cir. 1982) (court
contrasted record in Young to "empty" record before it); Fantasy Book Shop, Inc.
v. City of Boston, 652 F.2d 1115, 1125 (1st Cir. 1981) (remanded case for factual
findings stating, "the government bears the burden of proving some empirical basis
for the projections on which it relies"); Keego Harbor Co. v. City of Keego Harbor,
657 F.2d 94, 98 (6th Cir. 1981) (post hoc rationalizations are inadequate to support
city's ordinance). But see Northend Cinema, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 585 P.2d 1153
(Wash. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 945 (1979) (Zoning ordinance held valid in part
due to the fact that the ordinance was the "culmination of a long period of study.
and discussion.").
138. 475 U.S. at 51-52. Renton did not conduct any independent tests or
empirical data-gathering to justify or support the ordinance. Instead, Renton relied
on studies conducted in Seattle. See Northend Cinema, Inc. v. Seattle, 585 P.2d 1153
(Wash. 1978). In addition, the Court noted the deference given to the substantial
governmental interest in attempting to preserve the quality of urban life in Young.
475 U.S. at 50.
139. Id. at 52.
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precluded alternative locations for adult movie theatres." 40 The Court
found that the 520 acres was "ample accessible real estate" and stated
that "we have never suggested that the First Amendment compels the
Government to ensure that adult theatres, or any other kinds of
speech-related businesses for that matter, will be able to obtain sites
at bargain prices.' ' 14' The Court held that under First Amendment
principles, the city must only refrain from completely denying an
owner of an adult use the reasonable opportunity to open an adult
theater, and that Renton's ordinance "easily meets this require42
ment."1
It appears from the holding in Renton that municipalities have

been given much wider latitude in fashioning zoning ordinances which
restrict, either by dispersion or concentration, the location of adult
uses. The threshold issues of whether Renton-type ordinances abridge,

to some extent, protected First Amendment freedoms appears to have
been answered in the affirmative. 43 This conclusion mandates that
the cases be analyzed at some higher level of scrutiny; however, the
Supreme Court has not definitively agreed whether these cases should
be analyzed under the four-part O'Brien test or the three-part Heffron
test. 144
In Renton, the Supreme Court has clearly stated that curbing the
"secondary effects" of adult uses is a legitimate and substantial
140. Id. While the Court of Appeals did not quarrel with the district court's
finding that 520 acres were located in those zones where the location of adult theatres
were allowed, the appellate court did not agree that those parcels were "available."
Playtime Theatres, Inc. v. City of Renton, 748 F.2d 527, 534 (9th Cir. 1984). The
court found that a substantial portion of the 520 acres were already occupied by a
sewage disposal plant, a horseracing track, a developed business/industrial park, a
warehouse and manufacturing facilities, a Mobil Oil tank farm and a fully developed
shopping center. Id. The court also distinguished the situation from that found in
Young, suggesting that nothing about the Detroit ordinance seriously limited the
number of sites available for adult uses, whereas the Renton ordinance did just that.
Id.

141. 475 U.S. at 54. Justice Brennan's dissent took issue with this conclusion
arguing that even if the ordinance was a content-neutral time, place and manner
restriction (which he argued it was not), the ordinance was unconstitutional because
a majority of the land zoned for adult theater use was either occupied or unsuitable
for those purposes. Id. at 64 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan concluded
that the Renton ordinance denied adult theatres the opportunity to relocate within
the community and was, therefore, unconstitutional. Id.
142. Id. at 53-54.

143. See,. e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 41-46
(1986); Young v. American Mini-Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976); SDJ, Inc. v. City of
Houston, 837 F.2d 1268, 1276-77 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1052 (1989).
144. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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governmental interest which may. be addressed through zoning regulation.' 4 This has even been noted by one Justice to be the case where
an ordinance is silent on the issue of secondary effects. 14 But some
lower courts have not hesitated to strike down ordinances which do
not provide a sufficient factual record to support the enactment of
the ordinance. 47 While the question of whether the enactment of this
type of zoning scheme is unrelated to the suppression of protected
expression is relatively settled, 48 zoning ordinances which completely
ban some form of protected First Amendment expression will likely
be treated as content-based legislation and subjected to strict judicial
scrutiny. In the future, the major battleground between municipalities
145. See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47-52
(1986); Young v. American Mini-Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976); SDJ, Inc. v. City of
Houston, 837 F.2d 1268, 1276-77 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1052 (1989);
see also International Eateries of America v. Broward County, 941 F.2d 1157 (11th
Cir. 1991). In Int'l Eateries, the Eleventh Circuit discussed the requirement that an
ordinance be "narrowly tailored" in the context of fact that the Broward County
ordinance was intended to combat the "secondary effects" of adult uses. Finding
refuge in the Supreme Court's decision in Renton, the court circularly reasoned that
although there is no evidence that secondary effects follow from the adult uses, so
long as the ordinance's distance requirements are no greater than necessary to combat
these unproven secondary effects, the ordinance is, ipso facto, narrowly tailored.
And because the Broward County ordinances went no further than the ordinances
approved in Renton, the ordinances must be narrowly tailored. 941 F.2d at 1163.
But see Christy v. City of Ann Arbor, 824 F.2d 489 (6th Cir. 1987) (lack of record
evidence relating to purposes of the zoning ordinance means district court abused its
discretion in holding that City has offered sufficient justification to support finding
of substantial governmental interest).
146. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring).
Justice Souter, concurring in a plurality opinion, disagreed with Chief Justice
Rehnquist's opinion that "protecting societal order and morality" is a sufficient
governmental interest on which to uphold an ordinance banning all public nudity.
Instead, Justice Souter rested his opinion that a substantial governmental interest
existed on the fact that the ordinance would combat the "secondary effects" of adult
uses, despite the fact that the statute in question in Barnes was silent as to its
purposes. In fact, Justice Souter's concurrence specifically recognized this deficiency
when he wrote "It is, of course, true that this justification [secondary effects] has
not been articulated by Indiana's legislature or by its courts." Id. at 2469 (Souter,
J., concurring). But see International Eateries of America v. Broward County, 941
F.2d 1157, 1162 n.3 (l1th Cir. 1991) (refusing to imply a substantial governmental
interest "where none is evident in the ordinance").
147. See, e.g., Tollis, Inc. v. San Bernadino County, 827 F.2d 1329, 1332-33
(9th Cir. 1987); Christy v. City of Ann Arbor, 824 F.2d 489, 493 (6th Cir. 1987).
148. See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 41-46
(1986); Young v. American Mini-Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976); SDJ, Inc. v. City of
Houston, 837 F.2d 1268, 1276-77 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1052 (1989).
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and adult business owners and operators will probably focus essentially on whether the enacted regulation furthers a substantial governmental interest and whether the regulation allows reasonable alternative
channels of communication.' 4 9 Without the benefit of any subsequent
Supreme Court pronouncements on the subject since the decision in
Renton, it is necessary to look at the decisions of the lower courts,
federal and state, to determine what standards and rules of law are
being used to guide the legal decision-making, which, in turn, will
ultimately guide the form that any future zoning regulations must
take in order to pass muster under the federal constitution.
D. SUBSEQUENT LOWER COURT DECISIONS
The lower court decisions subsequent to Renton have focused
primarily on (1) whether the factual record is adequate to find that
the ordinance furthers a substantial governmental interest and is
narrowly tailored, and (2) whether the ordinance provides adequate
alternative channels of communication by allowing a sufficient number of sites on which adult uses can be located.
1. Substantial Governmental Interest: Is There Sufficient
Evidence in the Record to Support the Ordinance?
A judicial determination of whether there is a substantial governmental interest has often rested on whether the municipality has
prepared an adequate factual record supporting both the necessity of
the ordinance and the fact that it is narrowly tailored to accomplish
its goals. Courts have taken two alternative approaches to the adequacy of the factual record since Renton. The first approach essentially defers to the municipality, and assumes that reliance on some
other city's factual record, most often the Detroit record from Young,
is sufficient for constitutional purposes.5 0 The second approach is a
149. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
150. See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc, 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2468-69 (1991)
(Souter, J., concurring). In the plurality opinion of Chief Justice Rehnquist, the
Court also recognized that despite the fact that "[i]t is impossible to discern, other
than from the text of the statute, exactly what governmental interest the Indiana
legislators had in mind," the statute's interest in "protecting societal order and
morality is clear." Id. at 2461, and that such a purpose furthers a substantial
governmental interest. Id. at 2462. Therefore, under the plurality's approach, pro-

tecting societal order and morality may also be inferred as a substantial governmental

interest implicated in the ordinance. The only disagreement, then, between the

plurality and Justice Souter's concurrence is what governmental interest can be
inferred from a statute which is silent on that issue.
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somewhat more critical analysis of the factual record developed by
the municipality in light of the purposes of the specific ordinance.",

The first approach, i.e., inferring a governmental interest from
an ordinance which is otherwise silent on that issue, has been adopted

most notably in the Supreme Court's decision in Barnes v. Glen
Theatre, Inc. 1 2 In International Eateries of America v. Broward

County,'" the court specifically noted in dictum that based on Barnes,
one could conclude that the second prong of O'Brien, requiring an

ordinance to further an important or substantial governmental inter54
est, could be satisfied through inference.
This second approach of critically analyzing the factual record
has also been employed most notably in City of Renton v. Playtime
Theatres, Inc.," Christy v. City of Ann Arbor," 6 and Tollis, Inc. v.
San Bernadino County. 117 In these cases, the courts have consistently
held that a municipality may rely on the factual studies and record

151. See, e.g., Tollis, Inc. v. San Bernadino County, 827 F.2d 1329, 1332-33
(9th Cir. 1987) ("At a minimum, however, there must be a logical relationship
between the evil feared and the method selected to combat it ....

The County must

show that in enacting the particular limitations it places upon adult theaters, it relied
upon evidence permitting the reasonable inference that, absent such limitations, the
adult theaters would have harmful secondary effects."); Christy v. City of Ann
Arbor, 824 F.2d 489, 493 (6th Cir. 1987) ("Although both the Supreme Court in
Renton, 106 S. Ct. at 931, and the Sixth Circuit in CLR v. Henline, 702 F.2d at 639,
have stated that a city need not conduct new independent studies to justify adult
business zoning ordinances, both courts have required some relevant evidence to
demonstrate that the zoning ordinance was intended to address the secondary effects
of adult businesses."); see also Keego Harbor Co. v. City of Keego Harbor, 657
F.2d 94, 97 & n.3. (6th Cir. 1981).
152. 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991).
153. 941 F.2d 1157 (lth Cir. 1991).
154. Id. at 1159-60. It was primarily because the plurality and concurring
opinions in Barnes differed on the issue of what governmental interest could be
inferred did the court in Intl Eateries determine that the secondary-effects analysis
in Renton was still controlling. Id. at 1161. In Int' Eateries, the owners argued that
because the County relied on the Detroit factual record, and because the ordinance
did not mirror the Detroit ordinance exactly, the County could not rely on the Detroit
record to support the finding of a substantial governmental interest. The court, in
applying the secondary-effects test outlined in Renton, determined that the differences
in the methodology chosen to "combat the secondary effects of adult theaters does
not call into question [a city's] identification of those secondary effects or the
relevance" of other city's experiences. Id. at 1163 (quoting Renton, 475 U.S. at 52).
Thus, the court concluded that a substantial governmental interest was served.
155. 475 U.S. 41, 51-52 (1986).
156. 824 F.2d 489, 491, 493 (6th Cir. 1987).
157. 827 F.2d 1329, 1332-33 (9th Cir. 1987).
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of other cities. However, the record for the particular ordinance being
challenged must reflect factual support for its substantial governmental interest. In practice, this likely means only that a city cannot
defend its ordinance from attack on a completely blank record as
were the cases in Christy and Tollis.
2. Adequate Reasonable Alternative Channels of Communication
for the Dissemination of the Protected Expression
The determination of whether reasonable alternative channels of
communication remain open for the dissemination of protected expression ultimately rests on a subjective judicial determination of how
much available land constitutes enough to validate an ordinance. This
subjectivity is evident from the wide range of available land, often
measured as a percentage of total land space of the municipality,
which has been used by the courts to justify either the striking down
or upholding of substantively similar ordinaces.
In Woodall v. City of El Paso,I" the most recent pronouncement
on the subject from a United States Court of Appeal, the court
focused its analysis on whether the ordinance enacted by the city of
El Paso allowed reasonable alternative channels of communication
for the dissemination of protected First Amendment expression. 5 9 At
trial, the city's evidence showed that the ordinances permitted the
location of adult businesses on 1,433 of El Paso's 158,000 acres, or
0.91 % of the available acreage in the City. 16 The owners of the adult
businesses then produced expert testimony showing that it is virtually
impossible for the adult businesses to relocate on most of the 1,433
acres available for relocation under the ordinances. 6' The jury in the
case was instructed almost verbatim from the Supreme Court's holding
in Renton, '1 and the court entered judgment in favor of the city on
158. 950 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1992).
159. Much like the ordinances in Young and Renton, under the El Paso
ordinance, adult businesses were prohibited from locating within 1,000 feet of
churches, schools, residences, nurseries, parks, and each other. EL PAso, TEx.,
ORDINANCEs 6169 (1978), 8926 (1987), 9326 (1988); EL PAso, TEX., CODE ART. II §
20.08.080.A (Mar. 1989). Woodall, 950 F.2d at 257.
160. Woodall, 950 F.2d at 257.
161. Id.
162. The district court gave the following instruction:
For the purpose of determining whether acreage or sites are "reasonably
available," you are instructed that adult entertainment businesses must fend
for themselves in the real estate market, on an equal footing with other
prospective purchasers and lessees. Acreage and sites are not "unavailable"

1992:6711

ZONING FOR ADULT USES

the jury's verdict. 63
64
The Fifth Circuit quoted extensively from the Renton decision,1
reviewed the facts found in the district court and court of appeals,
and discussed the Supreme Court's language in Renton in light of
those facts. 65 The Fifth Circuit concluded that, despite the Ninth
Circuit's determination in Renton that a "substantial part" of the
520 acres zoned for adult businesses was constitutionally unavailable,
the Supreme Court could obviously have found two available sites on
the remaining property zoned for adult businesses.'"6 The court's
opinion concluded with an analysis of the jury instructions regarding
reasonable alternative avenues of communication and held that the
trial court should have instructed the jury that "land cannot be found
to be reasonably available if its physical or legal characteristics ma[ke]
67
it impossible for any adult businesses to locate there."'
In Purple Onion, Inc. v. Jackson,'" the district court found,
inter alia,' 69 that the ordinance unreasonably restricted public access
solely because they are already occupied by existing businesses, or because
"practically none" of the undeveloped land is currently for sale or lease, or
because in general there are no "commercially viable" adult entertainment
sites within the area which complies with the ordinance. Although the First
Amendment guards against the enactment of zoning ordinances which have
"the effect of suppressing, or greatly restricting access to lawful speech,"
the First Amendment does not compel the City of El Paso to insure adult
entertainment businesses, or any other kind of speech related businesses,
will be able to obtain sites at bargain prices.
Woodall, 950 F.2d at 257.
163. Id. The jury found that there were 39 adult businesses operating in El
Paso, and that there were 59 sites located within those areas designated for location
of adult businesses under the ordinances. Id. The jury also found that the ordinances
did not deny the adult business owners "a reasonable opportunity to open and
operate their adult entertainment businesses." Id.
164. Id. at 259.
165. Id. The court stated that "[wie will not read the Court's Renton decision
to deem sewage treatment facilities as reasonable alternative avenues of communication for protected speech, especially when there is a much more plausible understanding of the Court's disagreement with the Ninth Circuit's reasoning." Id. In particular,
the Fifth Circuit noted that in Renton, there were no existing adult entertainment
businesses at the time of the enactment of the zoning ordinance. Therefore, it would
not be necessary for the City to show that there were a great number of available
sites in order for the ordinance to be found to have left open reasonable alternative
channels of communication for the protected expression. Id.
166. Id. at 260.
167. Id.at 263.
168. 511 F.Supp. 1207 (N.D.Ga. 1981).
169. In addition to finding that the ordinance was unconstitutional because of
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to protected First Amendment expression. 70 Pursuant to the ordinance, all but 81 sites were completely banned and, of those 81 sites,
the court found at most 10 suitable for relocation of existing adult
uses.' 7' Relying primarily on Young, the court held that
[s]ince the effect of the ordinance's overall scheme of both
dispersing adult businesses from each other and confining
them to undesirable industrial areas of the city and to the
downtown business district, where there are very few possible
adult business locations, is to greatly restrict public access to
presumptively protected speech and expression, the ordinance
is void for violation of the First Amendment to the Constitution. 72
In North Street Book Shoppe, Inc. v. Village of Endicott,' a
challenge to an ordinance in a village where only one adult use was
then located and only two possible relocation sites were available
under the ordinance, the court found both possible sites unacceptable
because "at the very least, plaintiff established that relocation would
be commercially undesirable due to the difficulty and expense of
obtaining a permissible site and of constructing or converting a
structure for use as a bookstore, coupled with the probable decrease
in business due to the less favorable location.' ' 74 Therefore, the court
concluded that the ordinance "would have the effect of significantly
burdening plaintiff's expression and impairing public access to sexu7
ally-oriented material in Endicott."'
III.

CONSIDERATIONS

Ultimately, whether one agrees or disagrees with the Supreme
Court's decisions in Young, Schad and Renton, the questions which
its failure to provide reasonable alternative channels of communication, 511 F. Supp.
at 1223-25, the court struck down the ordinance for vagueness, id. at 1218-19,
overbreadth, id. at 1219-23, and for violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, id. at 1225-27.

170. Id.at 1223-25.

171. Id. at 1216. In addition to finding that "all but ten or so of the 81 sites
are wholly unacceptable as sites for adult businesses," the court also found that "of
these ten, no more than three or four of the sites are sites which a reasonably prudent
investor owning an adult-type business would consider as a possible site to establish
such a business." Id.
172. Id. at 1225 & n.23. (emphasis in original).
173. 582 F. Supp. 1428 (N.D.N.Y. 1984).
174. Id. at 1432.
175. Id.
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remain for municipalities and adult use owners alike is how these
decisions affect the roles of the respective parties, what can be
expected of those parties in real-life situations, and how the standards
are being applied in the lower courts where the majority of cases end.
The tension between the protections afforded under the First
Amendment and the deference normally given local zoning ordinances
has led to substantial litigation in order to clarify the place of each
legal principle. The Supreme Court's pronouncements have led to the
application of both the O'Brien factors and at least one factor from
Heffron. The three most easily remedied problems found in zoning
ordinances regulating adult uses ate: (1) the ordinance must provide
a sufficient factual basis to support a finding of substantial or
important governmental interest; (2) the ordinance's definitions of
adult uses and restrictions must be narrowly tailored to affect only
those businesses which the ordinance intends to regulate; and (3) the
ordinance must provide for reasonable alternative channels of communication for the dissemination of the affected expression protected
under the First Amendment.
If municipalities take care not to attempt using their zoning
ordinances to eliminate adult uses from their community and pay
attention to these important aspects of their ordinances, the likelihood
that the ordinance will be upheld in litigation should increase. On the
other side, where owners and operators of adult uses understand the
more common problem areas in proposed ordinances, and can help
cure those deficiencies prior to enactment, the amount of litigation in
this area should decrease.
This section is not intended to answer all the practical and legal
questions a municipality may encounter in drafting and enforcing a
zoning ordinance relating to adult uses. Instead, it is intended to raise
questions in those areas most often litigated with an eye towards
avoiding litigation and confrontation. If municipalities contemplating
passage of adult use zoning restrictions attend to the issues raised in
this section, the likelihood of confusion by owners and operators of
adult uses will be diminished, and the possibility that an adult use
zoning ordinance will be struck down as unconstitutional should be
reduced.
A.

SUBSTANTIAL GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST: IS THERE SUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO SUPPORT THE ORDINANCE?

The first major area of concern in adult use zoning ordinances
focuses on the factual record which is built by a municipality prior
to the passage of any restrictive zoning legislation. 76 Two basic types
176. It should be noted that some municipalities have attempted to both disperse
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of zoning ordinances have been implemented which restrict adult
businesses, both of which have withstood judicial scrutiny. First,
municipalities have enacted ordinances which disperse adult uses, such
as those used in Detroit' 77 and Seattle. 171 Second, municipalities have
enacted ordinances which concentrate adult uses to specified areas,
such as that seen in Renton. 179 In this context, there are two simple
alternatives for building a factual record which will support an adult
use ordinance, both of which have withstood Supreme Court scrutiny.
First, and most expensive, a municipality can hire experts in demography, crime, traffic, housing, real estate valuation, commerical development, and an almost inexhaustible variety of other concerns in
order to build its own factual record.
Every zoning ordinance should include a factual record, including
a record of public meetings and discussions relating to the ordinance
and a written statement of purpose for, and made a part of, the
ordinance. The factual record should include two important components: first, the studies should indicate that there is a link between
adult uses and the problems addressed by the study; and second, the
study should indicate that the method chosen, whether dispersal or
concentration, is likely to address those identified problems.
The second alternative is to borrow from the factual record of
other cities who have enacted similar legislation. While the Supreme
Court's opinion in Renton teaches us that building an independent
factual record is not necessary, 80 be advised that language in Renton
itself, and opinions from the Courts of Appeal subsequent to Renton,
indicate clearly that a municipality's failure to address the governmental interest issue can be fatal to the constitutionality of an
ordinance. Therefore, if a municipality should choose to borrow from
other cities' experiences in building their factual record, the statement
of purposes for the ordinance should clearly identify the finding of
the municipality that there is a link or nexus between adult uses and
certain secondary effects, the particular secondary effects of adult

adult uses using minimum distance requirements from other uses such as residences,
churches, schools and the like, as well as simultaneously concentrating those adult
uses in industrial, light industrial or commercial zones.
177. See Young v. American Mini-Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
178. See Northend Cinema, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 585 P.2d 1153 (Wash. 1978).
179. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
180. Renton, 475 U.S. at 50-52. While the Court stated that -it is not necessary
for a municipality to conduct new studies and build an independent factual record,
this is the case "so long as whatever evidence the city relies upon is reasonably
believed to be relevant to the problem that the city addresses." Id. at 51-52.
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uses which the ordinance seeks to address, and a legislative finding
that the ordinance in question in fact addresses those secondary
effects. It is important to note that the situation of the borrowing
municipality need not be identical to that of the municipality borrowed
from, and the ordinances need not mirror one another.' Courts have
specifically rejected such challenges to findings of substantial governmental purpose; the fact that a municipality borrows its factual record
from another city where the ordinances passed were not identical is
82
irrelevant.
In addition to a statement of purpose which reflects the nexus
between adult uses and their secondary effects, the factual record
should also contain, to the extent practicable and feasible, some
factual findings or record of presentations at public meetings which
support the nexus between the secondary effects and the method
chosen to combat those secondary effects. This additional information
allows a court to determine that the legislative body understood the
secondary effects and made a knowing and intelligent determination
that the ordinance reasonably was believed to be a proper and effective
method of combatting the secondary effects found. This suggestion
becomes more difficult for those municipalities which choose to rely
on the experiences and factual record of other cities. Under these
circumstances, the borrowing municipality should obtain as complete
a record as possible from the city from which they are borrowing.
This should include, where possible, testimony or reports from urban
planners, demographers, crime experts, traffic consultants, and experts in housing, real estate valuation, commerical development, and
the like. Municipalities with more limited resources, or a desire to
spend those resources in other areas, should not shy away from
obtaining factual material from more than one municipality to buttress
their factual record. Finally, in order to provide as complete a factual
record as possible in anticipation of potential litigation, the borrowing
municipality should place all the material relevant to its ordinance in
the official record prior to passage of the ordinance.
These steps should minimize the possibility that a reviewing court
will find a failure to provide adequate record support for a finding
that the ordinance serves an important or substantial governmental
interest.

181. Id.at 52.
182. See, e.g., Northend Cinema, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 585 P.2d 1153 (Wash.
1978).
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B. ADULT USE ZONING ORDINANCE MUST BE NARROWLY TAILORED

Under both the tests set forth in O'Brien and Heffron, the
governmental restriction must be tailored to accomplish that goal.
Under the fourth prong of the O'Brien test, "the incidental restriction
on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential
to the furtherance of that interest."'8 3 Under Heffron, the restrictions
must be narrowly tailored. Under either standard, the lesson is the
same for municipalities - the definitional portion of any zoning
ordinance which restricts adult uses must be carefully crafted to avoid
the fatal flaws of being either vague or overbroad.
Like it or not, adult uses are protected under the First Amendment. Ordinances which attempt to eliminate those uses, or preclude
their entry into the community, will ultimately fail as unconstitutional.
In keeping with the mandates of the First Amendment, an ordinance
must define critical terms with some precision. Under Renton, the
Supreme Court offered a simple and practical test for determining
whether an ordinance is narrowly tailored. There, the ordinance was
determined to be narrowly tailored because it affected "only that
category of theatres shown to produce the unwanted secondary effects ....

,,8s4 This requirement actually contains two components:

first, the definitions must allow those persons affected by the ordinance to have notice that they are or may be in violation of the
ordinance;' 5 and second, the definitions must not be so broad as to
include uses not shown to have produced the unwanted secondary
effects.'1
The definitions contained in the ordinance must be reasonably
precise. Definitions which are imprecise and cause confusion among those
affected by the ordinance will likely lead to litigation and more likely fail
judicial scrutiny. For example, in Purple Onion, Inc. v. Jackson,1'7 the
court noted the definitions of the terms: "adult book store,""' "adult
183. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
184. Renton, 475 U.S. at 52; see also International Eateries of America, Inc. v.
Broward County, 941 F.2d 1157, 1163 (11th Cir. 1991).
185. Challenges to an ordinance on this issue are generally brought as claims of
unconstitutional vagueness.
186. Challenges to an ordinance on this issue are generally brought as claims
that the ordinance is unconstitutionally overbroad.
187. 511 F. Supp. 1207 (N.D. Ga. 1981).

188. The Atlanta ordinance at issue defined an adult book store as
any building or structure which contains or is used for the display or sale
of books, magazines, movie films, still pictures and any and all other written
materials, photographic material, novelties, devices and related sundry items,
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theater," 8 9 and "adult entertainment establishment" 90 were impermissibly overbroad and, therefore, unconstitutional. The court noted
that under the definition of "adult book store" an offender need not
even be a commercial establishment and further noted that the Federal
Building in Atlanta would be included under the definition because
the Clerk's office keeps case files which contain some materials
covered under the definition. 19' Similarly, the court found that the
definition of "adult theater" even would include homes receiving Rrated movies by cable and the definition of "adult entertainment
establishment" would likely include the Atlanta Civic Center and
other "legitimate" theatre, "depending on how easily the patrons'
prurient interests are appealed to.' 1 92
In order to avoid a definitional quagmire, municipalities are
encouaged to refer to, and possibly borrow from, definitions which
have already withstood constitutional scrutiny. For puiposes of avoiding unwanted secondary effects, these definitions of adult uses and
establishments are more than sufficient to accomplish those governwhich are distinguished or characterized by their emphasis on matters
depicting, describing or relating to "Specified Sexual Activities" or "Specified Anatomical Areas", or an establishment with a segment or section
devoted to the sale or display of such material ....
Purple Onion, 511 F. Supp. at 1211 (quoting ATLANTA ZONING ORDINANCE § 161003(56)).

189. Under the ordinance, an "adult theater" is defined as a
[b]uilding or structure which is used for the viewing of performances or
activities by others, whether such performances or activities by others [sic],
whether such performances are in the form of live shows, motion pictures,
slide shows or other forms of photographic or visual display, which are
distinguished or characterized by their emphasis on matters depicting, describing or relating to "Specified Sexual Activities" or "Specified Anatomical Areas", as heretofore defined, or an establishment with a segment or
section devoted to the sale or display of such material.

Id. (quoting

ATLANTA ZONING ORDINANCE §

16-1003(58)).

190. An "adult entertainment establishment" is defined as
any building or structure which contains, or is used for commercial entertainment where the patron directly or indirectly is charged a fee to engage
in personal contact with or to allow personal contact by, employees, devices
or equipment or by personnel provided by the establishment or views a
series of dance routines, strip performances or other gyrational choreography
provided by the establishment which appeals to the prurient interest of the
patron, to include, but not to be limited to bath houses, massage parlors,
and related or similar activities.
Id. (quoting ATLANTA ZONING ORDINANCE § 16-1003(57)).
191. Id. at 1220 n.20.
192. Id. at 1220-21.
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mental goals. Even using those court-tested ordinances and definitions
as a starting point, municipalities will find themselves in a better
position by merely altering and amending those ordinances and definitions to suit their particular needs. As illustrated by the Atlanta
experience, care should be taken to insure that the definitions are not
overinclusive, potentially covering more businesses and situations than
intended. This lack of care and foresight not only invites litigation
from owners/operators of adult uses, 93 but also provides the courts
with a clear rationale for striking an ordinance.
C. AN ADULT USE ORDINANCE MUST LEAVE OPEN REASONABLE
ALTERNATIVE CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION FOR THE PROTECTED
FIRST AMENDMENT EXPRESSION

A cursory survey of cases dealing with this prong of the Heffron
test suggests that there is no mathematical formula which can be
adopted or used by a municipality for determining in advance whether
the amount of space available will satisfy constitutional standards.
Following Renton, however, it appears that the Supreme Court has
opened the door for a more relaxed view toward this requirement.
In Renton, the Supreme Court reiterated the mandate that an
ordinance leave open reasonable alternative avenues of communication.' 9 This requirement generally is satisfied through the utilization
of land use inventories which determine exactly how many sites will
be available once the ordinance becomes effective. Where lower courts
had previously looked at the commercial availability or the economic
viability of the sites which remained to determine whether they were
truly "available" for constitutional purposes, the Court in Renton
stated that adult use owners must
94

fend for themselves in the real estate market, on an equal
footing with other prospective purchasers and lessees ....
And although we have cautioned against the enactment of
zoning regulations that have 'the effect of suppressing, or
greatly restricting access to, lawful speech,' .....

,

we have

never suggested that the First Amendment compels the Government to ensure that adult theaters, or any other kinds of

193. Additionally, if the definitions in a dispersal ordinance are vague, it makes
it virtually impossible to determine where alternative sites exist. In so limiting the
potential alternative sites, the courts are more likely to find that the ordinance closes
reasonable alternative channels of communication.
194. See supra notes 158-75 and accompanying text.
195. Renton, 475 U.S. at 53-54.
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speech-related businesses for that matter, will be able to obtain
sites at bargain prices.'9
The effect of the Court's pronouncement is not entirely clear at
this time. What is clear is that the Court has opened up the door for
the lower federal courts to make a subjective determination about the
viability of available sites for adult uses, and that this subjective
determination does readily allow an owner/operator of an adult use,
or a municipality contemplating enactment of an adult use zoning
ordinance, to determine in advance what number of sites, or what
amount of land, will pass constitutional scrutiny.
As previously discussed, the court in Purple Onion struck down
an ordinance which provided acceptable locations on ten sites, where
over forty existing adult uses were already located in Atlanta; 97 the
court in North Street Book Shoppe struck down an ordinance which
provided for two sites, where there was only one existing use; 9 8 the
Supreme Court in Renton upheld an ordinance which provided for at
least 520 acres, or something in excess of 5 percent of the city's land
space, but where there were no existing adult uses;'9 the court in S
& G News, Inc. v. City of Southgate'00 upheld the constitutionality
of an ordinance which restricted adult uses to only 2.3 percent of the
county's land area; in Dumas v. City of Dallas,20' the court upheld
an ordinance which provided relocation possibilities in eight to ten
percent of the city; and in Christy v. City of Ann Arbor, the trial
court upheld an ordinance which restricted adult uses to .23 percent
of the city. 2°
While no mathematical percentage will guarantee that
an ordinance will be found constitutional or unconstitutional, there are some
helpful hints which can be followed to increase the likelihood that an
ordinance will be upheld. First, never allow less relocation sites than
there are existing adult uses in the community. As seen in Purple
Onion, this is a relatively easy way to have an ordinance struck down
196. Id. at 54 (quoting Young v. American Mini-Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 71 n.35
(1976)).
197. Purple Onion, Inc. v. Jackson, 511 F. Supp. 1207 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
198. North Street Book Shoppe, Inc. v. Village of Endicott, 582 F. Supp. 1428
(N.D.N.Y. 1984).
199. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
200. S & G News v. City of Southgate, 638 F. Supp. 1060 (E.D. Mich. 1986).
201. 648 F. Supp. 1061 (1986), aff'd sub nom., FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas,
837 F.2d 1298 (1988), aff'd in part, rev'd on other grounds, 493 U.S. 215 (1990).
202. Christy v. City of Ann Arbor, 625 F. Supp. 960 (E.D. Mich. 1986), vacated,
824 F.2d 489 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1059 (1988).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 12

for failure to meet the fourth prong of the Heffron test. Second,
make a factual record relating to the economic and political viability
of siting adult uses in the areas designated for adult uses under the
proposed ordinance. Employing a land use survey serves two important purposes. First, it allows the municipality to know in advance of
passage (and litigation) that there are sites which are economically
and politically viable for the relocation of sites. Since the courts will
surely examine this issue, a pre-passage land use survey may help a
municipality to amend its plans in order to provide adequate sites for
relocation in areas which are suitable for those purposes. Second, the
ability to graphically show owners and operators of adult uses exactly
where the relocation sites are under the new ordinance, and buttress
the municipality's position that the sites are viable, may enable the
city to avoid litigation entirely.
CONCLUSION

Striking a balance between two well-established and often contradictory legal principles has proven a difficult and imprecise judicial
exercise. While the courts have not provided definitive guidance on
all the legal questions involved in such an exercise of local zoning
power, municipalities desiring to combat the secondary effects of
adult uses have received sufficient judicial direction to enable passage
of such l9gislation which is relatively safe from judicial veto. Municipalities should take care to provide three essential elements in its
legislation and accompanying record: (1) a legislative record sufficient
to show a nexus between adult uses and particular secondary efffects,
and a legislative finding that the legislation address those secondary
effects; (2) a definitional section which is neither vague nor overbroad;
and (3) sufficient avalable land for the location and/or relocation of
adult uses. No amount of careful planning and drafting can preclude
the possibility of litigation; however, careful attention to these areas
may help reduce legal challenges and dramatically improve chances
that adult use legislation will be upheld.

